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“[A]ll the vexatious and annoying machinery of the custom-house, and the vigilance of its 
officers, are imposed by law to prevent even the smallest evasion of [the customs laws of the 
United States]."  
-Justice Samuel Freeman Miller (1882)1  
 
“The challenge for national security in an age of terrorism is to prevent the very few people 
who may pose overwhelming risks from entering or remaining in the United States undetected.” 
-The 9/11 Commission Report (2004)2 
Introduction 
In 2016, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel stationed abroad 
precleared eighteen million travelers, over fifteen percent of all commercial air travelers to the 
United States.3 Generally, at Preclearance locations, CBP officers inspect travelers for 
compliance with U.S. law before they board an aircraft bound for the United States, which 
eliminates the need for customs processing upon arrival.4 CBP currently has fifteen air 
Preclearance locations in six countries recently concluded two agreements to cover locations in 
Sweden and the Dominican Republic, and is negotiating with several more countries interested in 
establishing Preclearance locations.5  
 
1 Von Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215, 218 (1882).  
2 The 9/11 Commission Report 383 (2004), available at http:// www.9-
11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf. 
3 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Preclearance Locations, https://www.cbp.gov/border-
security/ports-entry/operations/preclearance (last visited Jan. 2, 2020). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. The countries in which CBP already has Preclearance locations are Ireland, Aruba, The 
Bahamas, Bermuda, United Arab Emirates, and Canada. 
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Meanwhile, on November 12, 2019, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts became the latest court to express its opinion on the constitutionality of 
suspicionless forensic electronic border searches in Alasaad v. Nielsen.6 Judge Denise Casper 
held that all electronic border searches require reasonable suspicion, taking the more popular 
position on the electronic border search debate.7 This debate over what level of suspicion 
forensic electronic border searches require has raged with particular ferocity since May 2018, 
when the Eleventh Circuit created a split among the lower courts.8  The conviction with which 
both sides of the debate have argued is understandable. On one side are privacy advocates 
pointing to the 2014 Supreme Court decision Riley v. California, in which the Court found that 
the search-incident-to-arrest exception did not apply to cell phones because of the heightened 
privacy interests that such technology implicates.9 Law enforcement advocates citing customs 
 
6 No.17-cv-11730-DJC, 2019 WL 5899371, at *1 (D. Mass. Nov. 12, 2019), appeal docketed, 
No. 20-1081 (1st Cir. Jan. 29, 2020); see also Sophia Cope et al., Federal Judge Issues Historic 
Opinion for Digital Privacy at the Border, Electronic Frontier Foundation (Nov. 15, 2019), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/11/federal-judge-issues-historic-opinion-digital-privacy-
border. 
7 Alasaad, No.17-cv-11730-DJC, 2019 WL 5899371, at *14. 
8 United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2018). 
9 See e.g., Thomas Mann Miller, Comment, Digital Border Searches after Riley v. California, 90 
Wash. L. Rev. 1943, 1946 (2015) (arguing that Riley supports “requiring at least reasonable 
suspicion, if not probable cause, for digital border searches”). 
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authorities’ centuries-old authority to conduct suspicionless border searches represent the other 
side.10  
One aspect of the electronic border search debate that has not received much attention is 
the regular execution of such searches at extraterritorial locations, namely foreign airports in 
countries which have Preclearance Agreements with the United States. Thus far, only one court 
has litigated the validity of extraterritorial border searches.11 However, although the Ninth 
Circuit thoroughly examined the extent to which the U.S.-Canada Preclearance Agreement 
authorized the search, it only briefly examined the reasonableness of the search in question under 
the Fourth Amendment.12  
This Comment will argue that forensic extraterritorial electronic border searches for 
contraband do not require individualized suspicion. Although forensic electronic border searches 
for contraband at the U.S. border and ports of entry (e.g., interior airports) may require, at most, 
reasonable suspicion according to some courts, the further reduced privacy expectations and 
further magnified governments interests involved in extraterritorial border searches dictate that 
 
10 See e.g., Michael Creta, Comment, A Step in the Wrong Direction: The Ninth Circuit Requires 
Reasonable Suspicion for Forensic Examinations of Electronic Storage Devices During Border 
Searches in United States v. Cotterman, 55 B.C. L. Rev. E-Supplement 31 (2014) (contending 
that a reasonable suspicion requirement is impractical and harmful to national security). 
11 United States v. Walczak, 783 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1986). In Alasaad v. Nielsen, one plaintiff 
was searched at a Toronto Preclearance Station, but the court did not address the extraterritorial 
element. No.17-cv-11730-DJC, 2019 WL 5899371, at *4. 
12 Walczak, 783 F.2d at 856. 
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forward-operating border officers merely adhere to the Fourth Amendment requirement of 
reasonableness with respect to U.S. persons. To support this argument, this Comment will 
proceed in five parts, first summarizing jurisprudence regarding the border search exception and 
routine versus non-routine border searches.13  
Second, it will examine recent case law examining the validity of electronic border 
searches.14 Third, this Comment will review the relatively sparse jurisprudence regarding the 
extraterritorial application of the Fourth Amendment.15 Fourth, it will argue that electronic 
border searches within or at traditional U.S. borders require, at most, reasonable suspicion, 
although the necessary level of suspicion in this sphere is far from resolved.16 Fifth, this 
Comment will analyze the necessary level of suspicion for electronic border searches at 
Preclearance locations in light of jurisprudence regarding the extraterritorial application of the 
Fourth Amendment.17 It should be noted that this Comment only focuses on those Fourth 
Amendment protections to which U.S. persons are entitled and, further, does not address 
electronic border searches for the purpose of finding general evidence of wrongdoing.18 Further, 
 
13 See infra part I, I.A, and I.A.1-2. 
14 See infra part I.A.3. 
15 See infra part I.A.4. 
16 See infra part II.A. 
17 See infra part II.B. 
18 To read comments that do address electronic border searches for the purpose of finding 
general evidence of wrongdoing, see generally Kelly A. Gilmore, Note, Preserving the Border 
Search Doctrine in a Digital World: Reproducing Electronic Evidence at the Border, 72 Brook. 
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this Comment examines the required level of suspicion for searches of electronic devices in 
general because, in addition to ensuring that this Comment is more concise and cogent, if no 
Supreme Court precedent supports distinguishing between electronic devices and other types of 
property at the border, it is equally baseless—and imposes unnecessary constraints on CBP 
officers and introduces complexity that is anathema to the border search doctrine—to distinguish 
between different types of electronic devices.19 
I. Background 
The Fourth Amendment states, in relevant part, “The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause. . . .”20 Two years before the 
Fourth Amendment was ratified, the First U.S. Congress promulgated the Act of July 31, 1789.21 
 
L. Rev. 759 (2007) (contending that neither the initial inspection nor the replication of digital 
evidence at the border is subject to a standard of reasonable suspicion) and Ashley H. Verdon, 
Comment, International Travel with a “Digital Briefcase”: If Customs Officials Can Search a 
Laptop, Will the Right Against Self-Incrimination Contravene This Authority? 37 Pepp. L. Rev. 
105 (2009) (arguing for the creation of a border search exception to the Fifth Amendment 
protection against self-incrimination for laptops). 
19 Infra part II.A.1.  
20 U.S. Const. amend. IV 
21 1 St. 29, 43, § 24 (“[E]very collector, naval officer and surveyor, or other person specially 
appointed by either of them for that purpose, shall have full power and authority, to enter any 
ship or vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise 
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This legislation authorized customs officers “to enter any ship or vessel, in which they shall have 
reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed; and 
therein to search for, seize, and secure any such goods, wares or merchandise.”22 However, with 
respect to dwelling-houses, stores, and other buildings, such as warehouses, the act required 
customs officers to obtain a warrant prior to conducting a search.23 Thus, the border search 
exception was born, before there was even a Fourth Amendment to which one could take 
exception.24  
 
subject to duty shall be concealed; and therein to search for, seize, and secure any such goods, 
wares or merchandise; and if they shall have cause to suspect a concealment thereof, in any 
particular dwelling-house, store, building, or other place, they or either of them shall, upon 
application on oath or affirmation to any justice of the peace, be entitled to a warrant to enter 
such house, store, or other place (in the day time only) and there to search for such goods, and if 
any shall be found, to seize and secure the same for trial . . . .”). 
22 Id. Interestingly, some courts have compared border searches of electronic media to searches 
of ship cabins at the border. See e.g., United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 
2018) (“[W]e have upheld ‘a search without reasonable suspicion of a crew member’s living 
quarters on a foreign cargo vessel that [wa]s entering this country,’ even though ‘[a] cabin is a 
crew member’s home—and a home ‘receives the greatest Fourth Amendment protection 
(citations omitted).’”). 
23 Id. 
24 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886) (“As this act was passed by the same 
Congress which proposed for adoption the original amendments to the Constitution, it is clear 
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Subsequent case law would later interpret “reason to suspect” and determine the required 
level of suspicion for border searches under a variety of circumstances.25 Nonetheless, this act 
elucidates that, “from the earliest days of the Republic, customs inspectors could board vessels to 
search for contraband without first obtaining a warrant.”26 A short time later, the Act of March 2, 
1799 granted customs officials plenary authority to search the baggage of persons entering the 
country “whenever the collector . . . shall think proper to do so.”27 
Almost seventy years later, Congress passed another significant piece of legislation that 
clarified customs officers’ authority regarding vehicles and goods crossing the border. The Act 
of July 18, 1866 permitted a customs officer to stop and search “any vehicle, beast, or person on 
which or whom he . . . shall suspect there are goods, wares, or merchandise which are subject to 
 
that the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as ‘unreasonable,’ 
and they are not embraced within the prohibition of the amendment.”); see also United States v. 
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 617 (1977) (citing Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623) (explaining that border 
searches are not subject to the warrant provisions of the Fourth Amendment) 
25 See infra part I.A. 
26 Laura K. Donohue, Customs, Immigration, and Rights: Constitutional Limits on Electronic 
Border Searches, 128 Yale L.J. Forum 961, 974-75 (2019) (“[F]rom the earliest days of the 
Republic, customs inspectors could board vessels to search for contraband without first obtaining 
a warrant.”). 
27 Ch. 22, § 46, 1 Stat. 662.  
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duty or shall have been introduced into the United States in any matter contrary to law.”28 In 
1925, the Court decided Carroll v. United States.29 It noted in dicta that “[t]ravellers may be so 
stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self-protection reasonably 
requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings 
as effects which may be lawfully brought in.”30 In its last significant piece of legislation before 
CBP’s border search authority was challenged for one of the first times in United States v. 
Ramsey more than four decades later, Congress enacted the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930.31 
One notable section provided that “all persons coming into the United States from foreign 
countries shall be liable to detention and search by authorized officers or agents of the 
Government.”32 The next section will examine the development of the modern border search 
 
28 See also Act of July 18, 1866, An Act further to prevent Smuggling and for other Purposes, ch. 
201, 14 Stat. 178 (1866). See generally Laura K. Donohue, supra note 26 (discussing the early 
history of the border search exception). 
29 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
30 Id. at 154. 
31 Ch. 679, 52 Stat. 1077, 1083 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1467 (2018)); see also 
Donahue, supra note 26, at 977 (“[T]he law empowers customs officers, acting pursuant to 
regulations issued by the Secretary of the Treasury or the Customs Service, to ‘enforce, cause 
inspection, examination, and search to be made of the persons, baggage, and merchandise 
discharged or unladen from’ vessels arriving at U.S. ports, regardless of whether the goods have 
previously undergone inspection.”) 
32 Section 582, 52 Stat. 1077, 1083. 
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exception, including the Court’s three most important border search decisions in the last forty-
five years and lower courts’ application of such decisions to electronic media. 
A. The Modern Border Search Exception 
In 1977, after almost two centuries without direct challenge, the Court first addressed 
CBP’s border search authority in United States v. Ramsey.33 The defendant and others had 
conducted an international “heroin-by-mail enterprise,” smuggling such contraband into the 
Washington, D.C. area from Thailand using letter-sized envelopes.34 A customs officer, 
inspecting international air mail from Thailand, spotted eight envelopes that were bulky.35 Given 
that Thailand was a known source for narcotics, that one of the letters felt as though it contained 
something other than correspondence, and that one of the letters weighed three to six times the 
weight of a normal airmail letter, the customs officer suspected that the envelopes might contain 
merchandise or contraband rather than correspondence and opened the heavy letter.36 Inside was 
a plastic bag containing a white powdered substance that he tested and determined to be heroin.37   
The Court found that the Act of July 18, 1866 authorized the search and that it was 
otherwise permissible under the Fourth Amendment.38 With respect to the latter, Justice 
Rehnquist reasoned, “[t]hat searches made at the border, pursuant to the long-standing right of 
 
33 431 U.S. 606 (1977) 
34 Id. at 608.  
35 Id. at 609. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 610. 
38 Id. at 615, 624-25. 
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the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this 
country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border, should, by now, 
require no extended demonstration.”39 Thus, because the officer conducted the search at the 
 
39 Id. at 616 (emphasis added); see also Nat. Treasury Empl. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 
670 (1989) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925)) (“We have long held 
that travelers seeking to enter the country may be stopped and required to submit to a routine 
search without probable cause, or even founded suspicion, ‘because of national self-protection 
reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his 
belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in.’”). Note that Justice Rehnquist found 
that there was no legally significant difference between envelopes mailed and envelopes carried 
across the border. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620 (“The critical fact is that the envelopes cross the 
border and enter this country, not that that are brought in by one mode of transportation rather 
than another. It is their entry into this country from without it that makes a resulting search 
‘reasonable.’”). 
11 
 
functional equivalent of the border,40 it was reasonable.41 Justice Rehnquist declined to 
determine “whether, and under what circumstances, a border search might be deemed 
‘unreasonable’ because of the particularly offensive manner in which it is carried out.”42 The 
sole dissenting opinion merely disagreed that the Act of July 18, 1866 authorized the search, not 
finding any fault with Justice Rehnquist’s Fourth Amendment analysis.43 
1. “Routine” Versus “Nonroutine” Border Searches 
In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,44 the Court began to define the contours of 
reasonable border searches, finding that routine searches do not require individualized suspicion, 
but that nonroutine searches do.45 In this case, customs inspector Talamantes detained the 
 
40 Compare Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (noting that domestic 
airports receiving nonstop flights from other countries and established stations near the border 
are examples of a “functional equivalent” of the border (FEB)) and Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616 
(assuming that a New York City post office that receives international mail is a FEB) with 
Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 274 (holding that a search by a roving patrol of the U.S. Border 
Patrol on a highway that is at all points at least twenty miles north of the Mexican border) and 
Torres v. Com. of Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 472 (1979) (finding that luggage searches of 
persons arriving in Puerto Rico from the United States do not constitute border searches) 
41 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620. 
42 Id. at 618 n. 13. 
43 Id. at 625 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
44 473 U.S. 531 (1985). 
45 Id. at 541. 
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defendant after arriving in Los Angeles on a direct flight from Bogota, Colombia—a source city 
for controlled substances—when he noticed from her passport that she had made eight recent 
trips to either Miami or Los Angeles.46 The defendant also possessed $5,000 in cash, mostly in 
$50 bills, and her stated purpose for travelling to the United States was unconvincing, as even 
Justice Rehnquist’s rendition of the facts implied.47  
At this point, Talamantes, who had apprehended dozens of alimentary smugglers arriving 
on the same flight as the defendant, suspected that she was smuggling narcotics in her alimentary 
canal and requested a female customs inspector to take the defendant to a private area and 
conduct a patdown and strip search.48 During the search, the female inspector felt what she 
thought was a girdle and noticed that the defendant was wearing two pairs of elastic underpants 
with a paper towel lining the crotch area.49 Later, after about twenty hours in detention, a 
 
46 Id. at 533. 
47 Id. at 533-34; see also id. (“Talamantes and another inspector asked respondent general 
questions concerning herself and the purpose of her trip. Respondent revealed that she spoke no 
English and had no family or friends in the United States. She explained in Spanish that she had 
come to the United States to purchase goods for her husband's store in Bogota . . . . She indicated 
to the inspectors that she had no appointments with merchandise vendors, but planned to ride 
around Los Angeles in taxicabs visiting retail stores such as J.C. Penney and K-Mart in order to 
buy goods for her husband's store with the $5,000.”) 
48 Id. at 534. 
49 Id. 
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physician conducted a rectal examination of the defendant pursuant to a court order, removing a 
balloon with cocaine in it.50  
The Court, represented again by Justice Rehnquist, found that the search of the 
defendant’s alimentary canal was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.51 Justice Rehnquist 
began, “[s]ince the founding of our Republic, Congress has granted the Executive plenary 
authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or a 
warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband 
into this country.”52 Citing Ramsey, he further noted that routine searches of the persons and 
effects of entrants do not require individualized suspicion.53 However, Justice Rehnquist 
ultimately, and narrowly, held that alimentary canal searches require reasonable suspicion after 
balancing the defendant’s heightened privacy interests—due to the invasion of her person—with 
the Government’s heightened interest in preventing smuggling, travelers’ reduced expectation of 
privacy at the border, and the great difficulty of detecting alimentary smuggling.54 Further, 
although he declined to rule on the required level of suspicion for “nonroutine border searches 
such as strip, body cavity, or involuntary x-ray searches,” Justice Rehnquist’s primary holding 
implied that alimentary canal searches are nonroutine and that nonroutine searches require at 
 
50 Id. at 535; id. at 546 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
51 Id. at 544. 
52 Id. at 537 (emphasis added). 
53 Id. at 538. 
54 Id. at 538-41. 
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least reasonable suspicion.55 Regardless, Justice Rehnquist found that the above facts “clearly 
supported a reasonable suspicion that [the defendant] was an alimentary smuggler.”56 
In the Court’s most recent decision on CBP’s border search authority, United States v. 
Flores-Montano,57 it held that a gas tank search does not require individualized suspicion.58 The 
defendant attempted to enter the United States at a southern California port of entry.59 During a 
second inspection of the defendant’s vehicle, a customs inspector inspected the gas tank by 
tapping it and noted that it sounded solid.60 The inspector then requested a mechanic to remove 
the tank, after which the inspector dissembled it and discovered thirty-seven kilograms of 
marijuana bricks inside.61 Now-Chief Justice Rehnquist found that the gas tank search was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.62 Before reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit yet again, he admonished the lower court, “the reasons that might support a 
requirement of some level of suspicion in the case of highly intrusive searches of the person . . . 
 
55 Id. at 541, n. 4. Note that all the searches listed are of one’s person. See also id. at 551 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing body-cavity searches, x-ray searches, and stomach-pumping 
as highly intrusive). 
56 Id. at 542. 
57 541 U.S. 149 (2004). 
58 Id. at 150. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 151. 
61 Id.  
62 Id. at 155-56. 
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simply do not carry over to vehicles.”63 Chief Justice Rehnquist elaborated, “[t]he Government's 
interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international 
border.”64 In other words, the Government has a “paramount interest in protecting[] its territorial 
integrity” that sharply contrasts with a traveler’s reduced expectations of privacy at the border.65 
Although he conceded that “some searches of property are so destructive as to require a different 
result,” Chief Justice Rehnquist held that “this [search] was not one of them.”66 Notably, in this 
case, no justice dissented.67 
2. Privacy Interests Regarding Searches of One’s Person 
Searches of one’s person vis-à-vis searches of property implicate disparate magnitudes of 
privacy interests, as implied in Montoya de Hernandez’s identification of only personal searches 
as nonroutine and explicitly discussed in Flores-Montano with respect to people and vehicles.68 
 
63 Id. at 152 (emphasis added). 
64 Id. (emphasis added). 
65 Id. at 153. 
66 Id. at 155-156. 
67 Further, Justice Breyer’s three-sentence concurring opinion merely noted that CBP’s 
recordkeeping with respect to its border searches should minimize concerns that the agency will 
conduct gas tank searches in an abusive manner.   
68 Id. at 152; see United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 n.4 (1985); id. at 
542. 
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Border search jurisprudence contains a distinction between searches of property and searches of 
persons that parallels the one found in the broader Fourth Amendment case law.69  
In Terry v. Ohio, regarding police patdowns for weapons, the Court noted that “[e]ven a 
limited search of the outer clothing . . . constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon 
cherished personal security.”70 Further, it stated in Missouri v. McNeely, a DWI case involving a 
warrantless blood test, that “an invasion of bodily integrity implicates an individual’s ‘most 
personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.’”71 Schmerber v. California came down the 
opposite way of McNeely, and the Court found the warrantless blood test was reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment based on the particular facts of the case.72 In other cases, the Court 
proscribed compelled surgical removal of a bullet from the defendant for evidentiary purposes73 
 
69 E.g., Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152. 
70 See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973) (describing the taking of a suspect’s 
fingernail scrapings as a “severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security”). 
71 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985). 
72 384 U.S. 757, 722 (1966); cf. id. (“It bears repeating, however, that we reach this judgment 
only on the facts of the present record. The integrity of an individual's person is a cherished 
value of our society. That we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States minor 
intrusions into an individual's body under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that 
it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.”) 
73 See Winston, 470 U.S. at 759 (“A compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body for 
evidence, however, implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the 
intrusion may be ‘unreasonable’ even if likely to produce evidence of a crime.”). 
17 
 
and forced stomach pumping.74 At least three circuits have constructed or positively cited tests 
for determining whether a border search is routine based primarily on physical factors such as 
use of force and exposure of intimate body parts.75 
3. Searches of Electronic Media  
Before addressing jurisprudence regarding searches of electronic media at the border, one 
must examine case law ruling on such searches in the interior since the Court has ruled on the 
latter and not the former. Further, decisions like Riley v. California76 and Carpenter v. United 
 
74 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) (“It would be a stultification of the 
responsibility which the course of constitutional history has cast upon this Court to hold that in 
order to convict a man the police cannot extract by force what is in his mind but can extract what 
is in his stomach.”). 
75 See United States v. Kelly, 302 F.3d 291, 295 n.3 (5th Cir. 2002) (echoing Montoya de 
Hernandez’s identification of only physical searches as nonroutine and citing United States v. 
Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1346 (11th Cir. 1984) (identifying three factors, including: (1) 
“physical contact between the searcher and the person searched”; (2) “exposure of intimate body 
parts”; and (3) “use of force”) and United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512 (1st Cir.1988) 
(describing six factors including: (1) whether the search requires exposure of intimate body parts 
or removal of clothing; (2) physical contact between the searcher and the suspect; (3) use of 
force; (4) whether the suspect is subjected to pain or danger; (5) the overall manner in which the 
search is conducted; and (6) whether reasonable expectations of privacy are abrogated by the 
search)) 
76 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
18 
 
States77 have—perhaps inadvertently—signaled to many lower courts that all electronic searches, 
whether at the border or not, trigger heightened privacy concerns. In Riley, the Court held that 
searches of cellphones incident to a lawful arrest require a warrant.78 Normally, under Chimel v. 
California, ensuring officer safety and preventing the destruction of evidence justify a 
warrantless search incident to arrest.79 However, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that neither of 
these rationales apply to cellphones seized after an arrest of a cellphone’s owner has taken 
place.80  
First, Chief Justice Roberts noted that data poses no threat to officer safety.81 Second, he 
characterized the Government’s chief concerns with respect to the destruction of evidence—
remote wiping and encryption—as insufficient justifications to dispense with the warrant 
requirement.82 More specifically, he wrote that officers could simply turn the phone off or 
remove its battery to prevent remote wiping or, if they are concerned about encryption, leave the 
phone powered on and place it in a aluminum foil sandwich bag.83 Chief Justice Roberts next 
 
77 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
78 Riley, 573 U.S. at 386. 
79 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
80 Riley, 573 U.S. at 387-91. 
81 Id. at 387. 
82 Id. at 388-91. 
83 Id. at 390. Chief Justice Roberts also noted that, if the police were confronted with a “now or 
never” situation, such an imminent remote-wipe attempt, they may be able to rely on exigent 
circumstances to search the phone immediately without a warrant. Id. at 391. 
19 
 
discussed the heightened privacy concerns that cellphone searches implicate due to the volume 
and variety of information they can hold and what such information can reveal about the 
cellphone owner.84 He also argued that, not only do cell phones contain in digital form many 
sensitive records previously found in the home, they also contain information never found in a 
home in any form.85  
In Carpenter, the Court found that the Government conducts a search when it accesses 
historical cellphone records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past 
movements, otherwise known as cell-site location information (CSLI).86 Writing again for the 
 
84 Id. at 393-97. 
85 Id. at 396-97. But cf. Ric Simmons, Why 2007 is Not Like 1984: A Broader Perspective on 
Technology’s Effect on Privacy and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 97 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 531, 534 (2007) (“Just as George Orwell misunderstood the implication of new 
technologies by focusing only on their use by government agents, Fourth Amendment scholars 
all but ignore the ways in which technology has enabled average citizens and criminals to keep 
their activities hidden from law enforcement.”). Compare id. at 540 (“[O]ne of the primary 
effects of technology on society over the past two hundred years has been to increase the amount 
of privacy in our everyday lives. Individuals—including criminals—can now conduct many 
more activities secretly, particularly activities which involve communicating, storing, or 
processing information.”) with United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (quotations 
marks omitted) (emphasis added) (“At bottom, we must assur[e] preservation of that degree of 
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”). 
86 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018). 
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majority, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that the defendant had a reasonable expectation that law 
enforcement agents would not and could not secretly monitor and catalogue his every movement 
over a long period of time and that the Government invaded this expectation of privacy when it 
obtained court orders to acquire the defendant’s CLSI from his telecommunication providers.87 
Thus, he maintained, the Government will need a warrant in the future to access CSLI, unless an 
exception—such as exigent circumstances—applies.88  
However, Carpenter need not be read as a prohibition on the warrantless access of all data 
stored on electronic devices. Many lower courts have already held as much.89 Further, in a March 
 
87 Id.  
88 Id. at 2222 (“[C]ase-specific exceptions may support a warrantless search of an individual's 
cell-site records under certain circumstances.”). 
89 See United States v. VanDyck, 776 Fed. App’x 495, 496 (9th Cir. 2019) (declining to extend 
Carpenter to IP addresses); United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2019) (same); United 
States v. Wellbeloved-Stone, 777 Fed. App’x 605, 607 (4th Cir. 2019) (same, plus subscriber 
information); United States v. Adkinson, 916 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that Carpenter 
“did not invalidate warrantless tower dumps (which identified phones near one location (the 
victim stores) at one time (during the robberies))”); cf. United States v. Saemisch, 371 F. Supp. 
3d 37, 42 (D. Mass. 2019) (“Carpenter does not provide an answer to the question whether the 
brief collection of real-time (as distinguished from historical) CSLI for an individual already 
subject to an arrest warrant implicates the Fourth Amendment.”). But cf. Daniel de Zayas, 
Comment, Carpenter v. United States and the Emerging Expectation of Privacy in Data 
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2019 decision situated more squarely within the border search context, the Seventh Circuit noted 
that “[a]lthough both [Riley and Carpenter] support [the defendant]’s general argument that the 
Supreme Court has recently granted heightened protection to cell phone data, neither case 
addresses searches at the border where the government’s interests are at their zenith, and neither 
case addresses data stored on other electronic devices such as portable hard drives and 
laptops.”90 
4. Searches of Electronic Media at the Border 
In 2017, CBP officers conducted approximately 30,200 searches of electronic devices at 
the border, roughly four times more than those conducted in 2015.91 However, despite the 
notoriety and litigation surrounding such searches, they only impacted 0.007 percent of the 397 
million international travelers processed by CBP officers in 2017.92 Although officers usually 
 
Comprehensiveness Applied to Browsing History, 68 Am. U. L. Rev. 2209, 2245 (2019) 
(arguing that Carpenter applies to browsing history). 
90 United States v. Wanjiku, 919 F.3d 472, 484 (7th Cir. 2019). 
91 CBP Releases Updated Border Search of Electronic Device Directive and FY17 Statistics, 
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-
media-release/cbp-releases-updated-border-search-electronic-device-directive-and (last visited 
November 2, 2019). 
92 Id. Given the massive volume of travelers that CBP processes annually, officers are unlikely to 
have the time, nor the inclination, to thoroughly examine “the jokes at which [travelers] have 
laughed” during an electronic search, contrary to what some commentators have suggested. 
Donohue, supra note 26, at 966. 
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have at least reasonable suspicion for more extensive searches,93 they also conduct a certain 
percentage of random searches of persons who appear entirely innocent for deterrence 
purposes.94 
Digital contraband can include child sexual abuse imagery, nuclear weapons designs, 
counterfeit currencies, classified information, classified information that requires an export 
license, stolen intellectual property, and more. 95 Child sexual abuse imagery, in particular, is a 
 
93 United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 570 (D. Md. 2014). 
94 United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 979 (9th Cir. 2013) (Callahan, J., dissenting in 
part). 
95 Donohue, supra note 26, at 1009 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1583(a)(1), (2) (2018) (warrantless 
searches of international mail for obscenity and child sexual abuse imagery); 6 U.S.C. § 
211(c)(2) (2018) (requiring CBP to ensure “the interdiction of persons and goods illegally 
entering or existing the United States”); id. § 211(c)(5) (requiring CBP to “detect, respond to, 
and interdict terrorists . . . and other persons who may undermine the security of the United 
States”); id. § 211(c)(6) (requiring CBP to “safeguard the borders of the United States to protect 
against the entry of dangerous goods”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) (2018) (prohibiting the 
knowing international transportation or shipment of child sexual abuse imagery); id. § 2252(a)(2) 
(prohibiting receipt or distribution of child sexual abuse imagery); id. § 2252(4) (outlawing 
possession of child sexual abuse imagery); 19 U.S.C. § 1583(c)(1)(A) (providing for the 
examination of outbound mail); 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (2018) (requiring the reporting of the export 
and import of certain monetary instruments)); Kelly A. Gilmore, Note, Preserving the Border 
Search Doctrine in a Digital World: Reproducing Electronic Evidence at the Border, 72 Brook. 
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massive problem.96 CBP inspectors search for such contraband either manually, forensically, or 
both. Manual, or “basic,” searches are “examinations of an electronic device that do not entail 
the use of external equipment or software.”97 Forensic, or “advanced,” searches “involve the 
 
L. Rev. 759, 787 (2007) (“As the rest of the world has turned to laptops and wireless 
communication devices for the storage of personal information, it appears terrorists have as well. 
During the investigation of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York, officials found 
detailed plans to destroy U.S. bound airliners in encrypted files on the suicide bomber's laptop.”) 
96 See A Criminal Underworld of Child Abuse, Part 1, The Daily (Feb. 19, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/19/podcasts/the-daily/child-sex-abuse.html (describing child 
sexual abuse imagery as reaching epidemic proportions ten years ago when only 600,000 images 
and videos were reported to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children annually, 
and in 2018, 45 million images and videos were reported); A Criminal Underworld of Child 
Abuse, Part 2, The Daily (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/19/podcasts/the-
daily/child-sex-abuse.html (noting that, in 2019, there were 70 million reports of child sexual 
abuse imagery—a more than fifty percent increase—and that this problem may only get worse as 
the one platform that vigorously polices itself, Facebook, transitions away from automatic 
scanning of images and videos transmitted via its messenger service to ameliorate user privacy 
concerns). An interesting question that these podcast episodes raise is whether the privacy of the 
people who transmit these images can coexist with the privacy of the abused children who 
appear in them. Id. In other words, does shielding the transmission of these images completely 
deny privacy to the exploited subjects of such images? 
97 United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 146 n.6 (4th Cir. 2018). 
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connection of external equipment to a device…in order to review, copy, or analyze its 
contents.”98 
Since the Court has not yet ruled on the level of suspicion required for electronic border 
searches, whether manual or forensic, this Comment must undertake a brief survey of relevant 
lower court decisions to understand the debate surrounding this issue. A plurality of circuits have 
held that reasonable suspicion is not required for forensic electronic border searches or have 
issued opinions that are consistent with United States v. Touset, the Eleventh Circuit’s 2018 
circuit-splitting decision that defied the Ninth Circuit’s reasonable-suspicion requirement.99 
 
98 Id. 
99 See e.g., United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. 
Jenkins, No. 5:11-CR-0602 (GTS), 2013 WL 12204395 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2013) (finding that 
forensic electronic border searches are routine, so long as they are not destructive of the device 
or carried out in a particularly offensive manner); United States v. Feiten, No. 15-20631, 2016 
WL 894452 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 9, 2016); United States v. Wanjiku, 919 F.3d 472, 484 (7th Cir. 
2019); cf. United States v. Linarez-Delgado, 259 Fed. App’x. 506 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that 
camcorders, as well as other electronic devices, may be searched without reasonable suspicion). 
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Further, four circuits—the Fifth,100 Sixth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuit101—have not directly or 
materially ruled on this issue. That leaves the Ninth102 and Fourth103 Circuits, which have clearly 
required reasonable suspicion for forensic electronic border searches, and the First104 Circuit, 
 
100 United States v. Molina-Isidoro, 267 F. Supp. 3d 900 (W.D. Tex. 2016), aff’d, 884 F.3d 287 
(5th Cir. 2018) (resolving case on good faith exception). But cf. Molina-Isidoro, 267 F. Supp. 3d 
at 908 (declining to extend Riley to searches of cell phones at the border); Molina-Isidoro, 884 
F.3d at 292 (concluding that government agents may reasonably view Riley as not overriding 
caselaw that allows warrantless border searches of cellphones). 
101 See e.g., United States v. Hassanshahi, 75 F. Supp. 3d 101 (D.D.C. 2014) (declining to decide 
the required level of suspicion); United States v. Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d 32 (D.D.C. 2015) (same). 
102 United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 2019); United States v. Cotterman, 709 
F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013). 
103 United States v. Aigbkaen, 943 F.3d 713, 720 (4th Cir. 2019); cf. United States v. Kolsuz, 
890 F.3d 133, 137 (4th Cir. 2018) (resolving the case on the good faith exception in favor of the 
Government, but doing so because the CBP officers’ search was based on a reasonable suspicion 
that the electronic device in question contained contraband). 
104 See Alasaad v. Nielsen, No.17-cv-11730-DJC, 2019 WL 5899371, at *1, *1 (D. Mass. Nov. 
12, 2019). But see United States v. Molina-Gomez, 781 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing 
United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-13 (1st Cir. 1988)) (finding that only highly intrusive 
searches of the person and destructive property searches are non-routine). 
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which appears to be moving in the same direction. Notably, the Court has repeatedly reversed 
Ninth Circuit border search decisions.105 
In Touset, as noted above, the Eleventh Circuit held that “no suspicion is necessary to 
search electronic devices at the border.”106 In this case, Xoom, a company that transmits money, 
notified Yahoo that it suspected that several of its email account holders were involved with 
child sexual abuse imagery based on a pattern of frequent low-money transfers to an individual 
in source countries for sex tourism and child sexual abuse imagery.107 Yahoo then conducted its 
own investigation and found a file with child sexual abuse imagery in the account for the email 
address iloveyousomuch0820@yahoo.com, which listed a phone number in the Philippines.108 
After Yahoo contacted the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, the Center 
contacted the Cyber Crime Center of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).109 DHS 
eventually discovered a Western Union account associated with the above email address that 
engaged in low-money transfers that listed the defendant’s name and a post office box in 
Marietta, Georgia.110 When the defendant arrived on an international flight in Atlanta, CBP 
 
105 Samuel A. Townsend, Note, Laptop Searches at the Border and United States v. Cotterman, 
94 B.U. L. Rev. 1745, 1746 (2014) (providing Montoya de Hernandez and Flores-Montano as 
examples). 
106 United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1229 (11th Cir. 2018). 
107 Id. at 1230. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
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officers searched his luggage, which contained an iPhone, a camera, two laptops, two external 
hard drives, and two tablets.111 A forensic search of the laptops and hard drives revealed child 
sexual abuse imagery.112 The defendant was later arrested and indicted for knowingly receiving, 
transporting, and possessing a computer or computer-storage device containing child sexual 
abuse imagery.113  
Judge William Pryor first noted that “[i]mport restrictions and searches of persons or 
packages at the national borders rest on different considerations and different rules of 
constitutional law from domestic regulations.”114 Next, he recounted that the Court has never 
required reasonable suspicion for a search of property at the border—only for “highly intrusive 
searches of a person’s body”115—nor has it distinguished between different types of property.116 
Rejecting the importation of Riley-esque principles into the border search context, Justice Pryor 
added that “electronic devices should not receive special treatment because so many people now 
 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 1231. 
114 Id. at 1232 (quoting United States v. 12, 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 
125 (1973)). 
115 Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (“Property and persons are different.”). 
116 Id. at 1233; cf. Orin S Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create a 
“Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?” 33 Conn. L. Rev. 503, 532 (2001) (predicting that judges 
will “avoid creating one Fourth Amendment for the physical world and another for cyberspace”). 
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own them or because they can store vast quantities of records or effects.” 117 Rather, he 
contended, CBP officers bear the same responsibilities “regardless of advances in technology, 
and “[i]f anything, the advent of sophisticated technological means for concealing contraband 
only heightens the need of the government to search property at the border unencumbered by 
judicial second-guessing.”118 Further, he argued that the Fourth Amendment does not guarantee 
the right to travel without inconvenience, citing reduced privacy expectations at the border and 
now-routine TSA screening procedures, and that passengers can leave any property they do not 
want searched, but not their bodies, at home.119  
Nonetheless, five years earlier, the Ninth Circuit mandated reasonable suspicion for 
forensic electronic border searches in United States v. Cotterman.120 While attempting to enter 
 
117 Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233; see also id. at 1234 (noting that, in Riley, the Court limited its 
holding to the search-incident-to-arrest exception); id. at 1235 (citations and quotation marks 
omitted) (“In Riley, the Supreme Court explained that the rationales that support the search-
incident-to-arrest exception—namely the concerns of harm to officers and destruction of 
evidence—did not ha[ve] much force with respect to digital content on cell phones because 
digital data does not pose comparable risks. But digital child pornography poses the same exact 
risk of unlawful entry at the border as its physical counterpart.”) 
118 Id.; see also id. (“[C]hild pornography offenses overwhelmingly involve the use of electronic 
devices for the receipt, storage, and distribution of unlawful images.”). 
119 Id. at 1235. 
120 709 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th 
Cir. 2019) (“clarify[ing] Cotterman by holding that ‘reasonable suspicion’ in this context means 
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the United States from Mexico, the defendant was referred to secondary inspection after the 
border agent discovered his prior conviction for seven counts relating to sexual conduct with 
minors.121 Forensic examination of two laptops produced hundreds of images and videos of child 
sexual abuse imagery.122 Judge Margaret McKeown first noted that, had the search ended with 
the initial manual examination of the laptops, it would have been valid.123 Thus, no circuit split 
 
that officials must reasonably suspect that the cellphone contains digital contraband,” rather than 
digital evidence). 
121 Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 957. 
122 Id. at 958. 
123 Id. at 960. Judge McKeown supported this conclusion with the assertion that the search was 
“in principle, akin to the search in [United States v. ]Seljan, where we concluded that a 
suspicionless cursory scan of a package in international transit was not unreasonable.” Id. 
However, the court in Seljan noted that the customs agents “opened and examined” three 
different packages belonging to the defendant over eighteen months and subsequently opened 
and carefully read the letters therein. 547 F.3d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 2008). “It is a strange hierarchy 
of values,” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 775 (1966) (Black, J. dissenting), that permits 
scrupulous personal examination of private letters by the Government but bars the use of 
software specifically designed to detect contraband that has been concealed. Cf. infra Part II.A.3 
(contending that forensic electronic border searches are often less invasive than manual ones). 
Later in her opinion, still oblivious to the facts of Seljan and the operational design of forensic 
software, Judge McKeown compared the use of forensic software to “painstaking[ly] . . . reading 
a diary line by line looking for mention of criminal activity.” Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 962-63. But 
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exists with respect to the principle that manual or routine electronic border searches do not 
require reasonable suspicion. She then justified a reasonable-suspicion requirement for forensic 
electronic border searches based on heightened privacy concerns borne out of the volume and 
intimate nature of the contents of electronic devices.124 Unlike the last three major Court 
decisions on border searches, Ramsey, Montoya de Hernandez, and Flores-Montano, Judge 
McKeown’s opinion all but omitted mention of the Government’s long-standing plenary 
authority to conduct suspicionless border searches and the reduced privacy expectations of 
international travelers, as Judge Consuelo Callahan elucidates in her concurrence in part.125 Both 
her opinion and the dissent reached the same conclusion as the majority in Touset. 
 
see infra note 231 (noting that officers often only access a thumbnail preview of images and 
videos that the software program identifies as relevant). 
124 Id. at 964. But see id. at 977 (Callahan, J., concurring in part) (citations omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971) (“‘[A] port of entry is 
not a traveler’s home,’ even if a traveler chooses to carry a home’s worth of personal information 
across it”). 
125 See id. at 971 (Callahan, J., concurring in part) (“Accomplishing th[e] Herculean task [of 
finding and excluding any and all illegal and unwanted articles before they cross the border] 
requires that the government be mostly free from the Fourth Amendment’s usual restraints on 
searches of people and their property. Today the majority ignores that reality by ejecting a new 
rule requiring reasonable suspicion for any thorough search of electronic devices entering the 
United States. This flouts more than a century of Supreme Court precedent, is unworkable and 
unnecessary, and will severely hamstring the government’s ability to protect our borders.”) 
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In Alasaad v. Nielsen, which was decided on November 12, 2019, the District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts held that all electronic border searches, whether manual or forensic, 
require reasonable suspicion.126 In one of the most recent challenges to CBP’s border search 
authority, several plaintiffs asserted that CBP officers had violated their Fourth Amendment 
rights under a wide variety of circumstances.127 Judge Casper reasoned that the fact that 
electronic border searches are meant to uncover, inter alia, threats to national security and 
contraband “is not a strong counterweight to the intrusion on personal privacy evidenced by such 
searches” without citing any authority.128 She also noted that the “deterrent effect” of the border 
search exception would not be significantly diminished under a reasonable suspicion 
requirement.129 Further, Judge Casper maintained that, although only border searches of persons 
have been deemed nonroutine by the Court, border searches of property can be nonroutine too 
because of the nature and quantity of information on electronic devices—citing Riley—and the 
 
126 See No.17-cv-11730-DJC, 2019 WL 5899371, at *1, *14 (D. Mass. Nov. 12, 2019) (finding 
that there was no meaningful difference between the two classes of searches in terms of the 
privacy interests implicated). 
127 See generally Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at *1 (D. Mass. 
May 9, 2018) (denying the government’s motion to dismiss and recounting the factual 
allegations in detail). 
128 Alasaad, No.17-cv-11730-DJC, 2019 WL 5899371, at *9. 
129 Id. at *10. 
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inconvenience to which travelers would be subjected if they left their electronic devices at 
home.130  
B. The Extraterritorial Application of the Constitution  
The Court has yet to rule on whether, or to what extent, the Fourth Amendment applies 
extraterritorially to U.S. persons.131 Thus, for the time being, lower court precedents which are 
largely in agreement, such as In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa132 and 
United States v. Stokes,133 govern. The Court has, however, ruled on the extraterritorial 
application of other parts of the Constitution and of the Fourth Amendment with respect to non-
U.S. persons, and such rulings provide a useful foundation for understanding the above two 
cases.  
The Court has frequently wavered back and forth between more formal and more 
functional approaches to extraterritoriality. A formal approach to extraterritoriality essentially 
denies the extraterritorial application of the Constitution altogether, only recognizing its 
 
130 Id. at *11-12. 
131 However, in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, Justice Brennan 
noted that “nothing in the Court's opinion questions the validity of the rule, accepted by every 
Court of Appeals to have considered the question, that the Fourth Amendment applies to 
searches conducted by the United States Government against United States citizens abroad.” 494 
U.S. 259, 283 n.7 (1990). 
132 552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008). 
133 726 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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jurisdiction where the United States exercises de jure sovereignty.134 A functional approach 
focuses more on elements of de facto sovereignty and the practical considerations of enforcing 
the Constitution abroad.135 For example, the Court went from functional to formal to functional 
again from Reid v. Covert136 to United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez137 to Boumediene v. Bush,138 
respectively.  
In what are commonly known as the Insular Cases,139 the Court issued a series of 
opinions at the beginning of the twentieth century following the United States’ acquisition of 
various territories from Spain, addressing fundamental questions regarding the Constitution’s 
 
134 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008). De jure sovereignty “implies a state's lawful 
control over its territory generally to the exclusion of other states, authority to govern in that 
territory, and authority to apply law there.” Id. at 754 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States § 206, cmt. b (1986)). However, determining whether a state 
enjoys de facto sovereignty over a certain territory involves an objective assessment of the power 
or control that that state exerts over such territory. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 754. De facto 
sovereignty does not require a claim of right. Id. 
135 Id. at 764. 
136 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
137 494 U.S. 259 (1990) 
138 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
139 De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); 
Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); 
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904). 
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geographic scope for the first time140 and finding that generally “the Constitution applies in full 
in incorporated territories surely destined for statehood but only in part in unincorporated 
territories.”141 Underlying the latter part of this holding was a practical—although partly racist—
understanding that the extent to which the Constitution applies extraterritorially must still be 
decided “as questions arise.”142 For example, in Dorr v. United States, the Court held that 
Congress need not establish a system of laws that includes the right of trial by jury in the 
Philippines, an unincorporated territory.143 Justice Day admitted that the people of the 
Philippines were entitled to fundamental constitutional rights and that, as a fundamental right, 
the right to trial by jury should logically “go[] wherever the jurisdiction of the United States 
extends.”144 However, he ultimately concluded that trial by jury would be impossible to 
implement in the Philippines, a “territory peopled by savages” who did not need or understand 
such system, and would “work injustice and provoke disturbance rather than [] aid the orderly 
administration of justice.”145  
Then, in the post-World War II case of Johnson v. Eisentrager,146 the Court denied 
habeas corpus protections to German soldiers who had been convicted of violating the laws of 
 
140 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 756 (2008). 
141 Id. at 757. 
142 Dorr, 195 U.S. at 149. 
143 Id. 
144 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
145 Dorr, 195 U.S. at 148. 
146 Id.  
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war and imprisoned, under U.S. custody, in Germany, “balance[ing] the constraints of military 
occupation with constitutional necessities.”147 Its holding partially relied on the fact, if the 
Constitution applied extraterritorially to enemy soldiers, that the Fifth Amendment would protect 
such persons from military trial, and the Sixth from civil trial, thereby preventing any trial at 
all.148 The Court also reasoned: 
To grant the writ to these prisoners might mean that our army must transport them 
across the seas for hearing. This would require allocation of shipping space, 
guarding personnel, billeting and rations. It might also require transportation for 
whatever witnesses the prisoners desired to call . . . . [During active hostiles, 
s]uch trials would hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy. 
They would diminish the prestige of our commanders . . . . It would be difficult to 
devise more effective fettering of a field commander than to allow the very 
enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account in his own 
civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad 
to the legal defensive at home.149 
Thus, here, as well as in the Insular Cases, practical considerations largely controlled the 
extraterritorial application of the Constitution. Although this case partially turns on the 
petitioners’ relationship to the United States, such analysis is not necessarily inconsistent with a 
functional approach. After all, as this Comment will discuss below with respect to Reid v. Covert 
and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, it leaves open the possibility that those persons outside 
of territory under the United States’ de jure sovereignty with a closer relationship to the United 
States can enjoy certain constitutional protections. 
 In Reid v. Covert, the Court rejected the idea that “when the United States acts against 
citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights,” finding that the Fifth and Sixth 
 
147 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 762. 
148 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 782. 
149 Id. at 778-79. 
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Amendments apply extraterritorially to U.S. citizens.150 Two civilian spouses, one in England 
and the other in Japan, had killed their servicemember husbands and were tried by U.S. military 
courts without a grand jury indictment or a jury pursuant to agreements with England and 
Japan.151 Writing for the plurality, Justice Black first seized on the sweeping language contained 
in both amendments, such as “no person” and “all criminal prosecutions.”152 He then noted that 
the reason treaties—like the ones with England and Japan—did not have to be made in 
“pursuance” of the Constitution in the same manner as federals laws was so that international 
agreements made under the Articles of Confederation, including the peace treaties which 
concluded the Revolutionary War, would remain in effect.153 Although he largely relied on 
legislative history to argue that the United States cannot exercise power under an international 
agreement without observing constitutional prohibitions, Justice Black’s approach can be 
categorized as formal because he spurned the suggestion that constitutional protections “are 
inoperative when they become inconvenient.”154  
Reid’s two concurring opinions, however, took a functional approach. In his concurrence, 
Justice Frankfurter asserted that the geographic scope of the Constitution must be determined on 
a case-by-case basis, consistent with the findings of the Insular Cases.155 Most importantly, 
 
150 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957). 
151 Id. at 3-4. 
152 Id. at 8. 
153 Id. at 16-17. 
154 Id. at 14.  
155 Reid, 354 U.S. at 50-51 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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Justice Harlan read the Insular Cases to hold that whether a constitutional provision has 
extraterritorial effect depends upon the “particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and 
the possible alternatives which Congress had before it” and whether judicial enforcement of the 
provision would be “impracticable and anomalous.”156 This concurrence later served as the 
analytical foundation for Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Verdugo and, later still, Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Boumediene.157 Further, practical considerations significantly 
influenced Chief Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion in Verdugo.158 
In Verdugo, the plurality held that the Fourth Amendment only applies extraterritorially 
to persons with a “substantial connection” to the United States.159 Since the defendant was a 
resident and citizen of Mexico and his property was in Mexico, Chief Justice Rehnquist found 
that the Fourth Amendment was inapplicable, and the Court did not address the level of 
suspicion that the Fourth Amendment would require if the defendant had had a substantial 
connection to the United States.160 Contrasting the Fourth Amendment’s “the people” with the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment’s “no person” and examining the Fourth Amendment’s legislative 
history, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that “the people” refers to a class of persons who are part 
of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with a particular 
 
156 Id. at 74-75 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
157 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277–78 (1990) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 759 (2008); id. at 770. 
158 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273–74. 
159 Id. at 271. 
160 Id.  
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country to be considered part of that community.161 He also reasoned that, in contrast to the 
Insular Cases, the alleged constitutional violation in this case occurred in a foreign territory, 
where Fourth Amendment claims are “even weaker,” rather than in those territories governed by 
Congress.162 As a practical matter, he noted that a warrant issued by a U.S. magistrate would be a 
“dead letter” outside of the United States and requiring one would present great difficulties in 
determining what is reasonable in the way of searches and seizures conducted abroad.163  
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy more closely aligned his analysis with the 
functional approaches employed in the Insular Cases and Eisentrager. He reasoned that there is 
“no rigid and abstract rule” that every provision of the Constitution applies extraterritorially, “no 
matter what the conditions and considerations are that would make adherence to a specific 
guarantee altogether impracticable and anomalous.”164 Here, he found, adherence to the warrant 
requirement would be impracticable and anomalous because of the absence of local judges or 
magistrates available to issue warrants, the differing and perhaps unascertainable conceptions of 
reasonableness and privacy that prevail abroad, and the need to cooperate with foreign 
officials.165 
 
161 Id. at 265–68. 
162 Id. at 268. 
163 Id. at 274. 
164 Id. at 277–78 (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
165 Id. at 278 (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
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In Boumediene, the Court held that the writ of habeas corpus extends to enemy alien 
combatants held at Guantanamo Bay.166 With respect to Verdugo, Justice Kennedy only cited his 
concurring opinion and not to the plurality, rejecting the Government’s arguments that the writ 
did not apply because the United States does not have de jure sovereignty over Guantanamo.167 
He examined the writ’s history, primarily through Scotland’s and Ireland’s legal relationship 
with England at the time of the Constitution’s framing.168 Justice Kennedy reasoned that it ran to 
Ireland, but not Scotland because English law applied in Ireland, but not in Scotland.169 This was 
despite the fact that England had de jure sovereignty over Scotland but not over Ireland.170 Thus, 
Justice Kennedy continued, the fact that no laws other than those of the United States apply at 
Guantanamo weighs in favor of the writ’s extension.171 Further, he noted that the United States 
clearly maintains de facto sovereignty over this territory.172 Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy 
 
166 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008). For a compelling argument as to why the 
Jury Trial Clause applies to enemy alien combatants held at Guantanamo Bay, see generally 
Thomas McDonald, Comment, A Few Good Angry Men: Application of the Jury Trial Clause of 
the Sixth Amendment to Non-Citizens Detained at Guantanamo Bay, 62 Am. U. L. Rev. 701 
(2013). 
167 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 760–61. 
168 Id. at 751. 
169 Id.  
170 Id. 
171 Id.  
172 Id. at 755. 
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cautioned that, under the Insular Cases, constitutional provisions should only be applied 
extraterritorially “sparingly and where [they are] most needed.”173  
Justice Kennedy ultimately devised three factors for determining the extraterritorial reach 
of the Suspension Clause: (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the 
process through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where 
apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving 
the prisoner's entitlement to the writ.174 Applying the first factor, he distinguished between this 
case and Eisentrager, noting that, although the petitioners were also not U.S. citizens, the 
prisoners in Eisentrager received far greater procedural protections regarding the determination 
that they were enemy combatants.175 Second, Justice Kennedy reasoned that, in contrast to the 
German prison over which the United States held temporary control after World War II in 
Eisentrager, Guantanamo “is no transient possession” and “is within the constant jurisdiction of 
the United States.”176 Third, extending the writ would not interfere with the military mission of a 
secure prison facility on a small, isolated, and heavily fortified military base; no other 
government has competing jurisdiction over the territory; the detention facility is not located in 
an active theater of war; and there are few practical barriers to the running of the writ.177 
 
173 Id. at 759. 
174 Id. at 766. 
175 Id. at 766–67. 
176 Id. at 768–69. 
177 Id. at 769–70. 
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1. The Extraterritorial Application of the Fourth Amendment 
Although the Court has not yet had an opportunity to rule on the extraterritorial 
application of the Fourth Amendment to U.S. citizens, several lower courts178 have held that the 
Fourth Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness—and not the Warrant Clause—governs 
extraterritorial searches of U.S. citizens.179 The most notable of such decisions is the Second 
 
178 In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, 552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Stokes, 726 F.3d 880, 892–93 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Agosto-Pacheco, 
No. 18-082 (FAB), 2019 WL 4566956, at *1, *9 (D.P.R. Sept. 20, 2019). Considering that In re 
Terrorist Bombings came down more than five months after Boumediene, it is strange that the 
Second Circuit did not cite or discuss Boumediene at all. Although the Boumediene holding was 
relatively narrow, Justice Kennedy did not explicitly cabin it to the Suspension Clause, and one 
would reasonably expect any federal court ruling on a question regarding the extraterritorial 
application of the Constitution to address the legal effect of—at that time—the most significant 
Supreme Court ruling on that question in almost two decades, even if the two cases address 
different parts of the Constitution. Cf. Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene's Quiet Theory: Access 
to Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2107, 2108 (2009) (noting that 
Boumediene raises the question of whether constitutional provisions other than the Suspension 
Clause apply at Guantanamo). 
179 See also Jay V. Prahbu, et al, When Your Cyber Case Goes Abroad: Solutions to Common 
Problems in Foreign Investigations, 67 DOJ J. Fed. L. & Prac. 167, 178–79 (2019) (“Foreign 
searches [] need only satisfy the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard . . . .”). 
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Circuit’s in In Re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa.180 In this case, U.S. 
intelligence agents conducted telephone surveillance in Kenya of the defendant, a U.S. citizen 
and suspected Al Qaeda associate.181 On the basis of intelligence collected through such 
surveillance, U.S. agents also searched the defendant’s home with the help of Kenyan 
authorities.182  
Judge Jose Cabranes first reasoned that neither search required a warrant because no legal 
authority suggests otherwise; a warrant issued by a U.S. judicial officer would likely have no 
legal significance abroad; and U.S. officials are not required to obtain warrants from foreign 
judicial officers.183 He also noted that whether U.S. judicial officers are even authorized to issue 
warrants for overseas searches is unclear.184 Nonetheless, U.S. officials must still meet the 
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement, under which the totality of the circumstances 
are examined to balance individual privacy interests and government interests.185  
Judge Cabranes then found that the search of the defendant’s home was reasonable 
because the Government had a powerful need to gather additional intelligence on Al-Qaeda’s 
activities in Kenya, which it had linked to the defendant, and the intrusion on the defendant’s 
 
180 Supra note 178. 
181 In re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 159, 161. 
182 Id. at 160. 
183 Id. at 169–71. 
184 Id. at 171. 
185 Id. at 171–72. 
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privacy was restrained and limited.186 He supported the latter conclusion with the following 
facts: the search was not covert; it was during the daytime and in the presence of the defendant’s 
wife; the scope of the search was limited to items which were believed to have foreign 
intelligence value; proper minimization procedures were followed; and U.S. officials monitored 
the defendant’s telephone communications for nearly a year before concluding that it was 
necessary to search his home.187 Further, although Judge Cabranes described the telephone 
surveillance as broad—encompassing calls made for commercial, family, or social purposes and 
loosely minimizing the information collected—and as a significant invasion of privacy, it was 
reasonable because of the inherent challenges of foreign intelligence collection.188 
 
186 Id. at 174. 
187 Id. at 173–74. 
188 Id. at 175–76. Specifically, Judge Cabranes identified the following difficulties: (1) complex, 
wide-ranging, and decentralized organizations warrant sustained and intense monitoring in order 
to understand their features and identify their members; (2) foreign intelligence gathering of the 
sort considered here must delved into the superficially mundane because it is not always readily 
apparent what information is relevant; (3) members of covert terrorist organizations often 
communicate in code or at least more ambiguous language, so more extensive and careful 
monitoring of these communications may be necessary; and (4) because the monitored 
conversations were conducted in foreign languages, the task of determining relevance and 
identifying coded language was further complicated. Id.  
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Another significant lower court decision is United States v. Stokes, 189 in which the 
Seventh Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit’s earlier decision. In this case, the defendant, 
originally a teacher in Miami, was placed on probation by a Florida court after indecently 
touching two minors who were his students.190 He then received permission to complete his 
probation in Thailand, where he engaged in sexual acts with minors for several years.191 In 2002, 
ICE agents based in Thailand were tipped off to the fact that the defendant had been fired from 
another teaching job in Bangkok for indecently touching male students, opening an investigation 
thereafter.192 About ten months later, ICE agents and the Royal Thai Police searched the 
defendant’s home in Thailand, recovering more than 6,000 images of the defendant’s sexual 
activity with minors from a digital camera, multiple compact discs, and a computer.193 
Prosecutors then indicted the defendant for traveling in foreign commerce for the purpose of 
engaging in a sexual act with person under eighteen years old and extradited him to the United 
States.194 Judge Diane Sykes found that no warrant was required for the reasons cited in the 
 
189 726 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2013). 
190 Id. at 885. 
191 Id. at 885–86. 
192 Id. at 886. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 886–87. 
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Second Circuit’s decision and that the warrantless195 search of the defendant’s home was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.196 She reasoned that investigators had probable cause 
that the defendant had committed a crime and evidence of it would be found in his home.197 
Judge Sykes also noted that the manner of the search was reasonable because the law 
enforcement team acted pursuant to a Thai search warrant; the search took place during the 
daytime hours; officers waited for the defendant to arrive before entering his home; the 
defendant was not restrained during the search; containers were not broken open; and the entire 
search only lasted about two hours.198  
 
195 “There is no question that the warrant [issued by a Thai judicial officer] used very general 
language,” and more importantly, there was no warrant issued by a U.S. judicial officer, so the 
search was effectively warrantless. Id. at 891. 
196 Id. at 893. 
197 Id. (“Stokes had been fired from two Thai schools in one year for touching children 
inappropriately. His colleagues at a third school told investigators that he continued to engage in 
similar behavior. Stokes had a history of sexually assaulting children[ ] and a criminal conviction 
for inappropriately touching a child in the United States. He was seen regularly hugging and 
kissing one particular male student. Two credible informants separately indicated that Stokes, an 
unmarried, middle-aged man, intimated that he was sexually attracted to children and boasted 
about living with young Thai boys. ICE Investigators also verified through cooperation with Thai 
authorities that a witness had, on at least one occasion, seen young boys reporting to Stokes's 
private quarters.”) 
198 Id. 
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Although foreign intelligence collection is not one of the objectives of extraterritorial 
electronic border searches, In re Terrorist Bombings, as well as Stokes, provide some guidance 
as to under what circumstances an extraterritorial search is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment in general. These cases suggest that such searches are reasonable when there is no 
damage to physical property; the scope of the search is limited to items that constitute digital 
contraband or otherwise fall under CBP officers’ authority to inspect or exclude; the search was 
not conducted covertly or without notice to the defendant; and the search is not too lengthy.199 
All of these factors are consistent with border search jurisprudence’s definition of 
reasonableness.200 
II. Analysis 
This Comment’s analysis will proceed in two parts: first, arguing that forensic electronic 
border searches conducted at the U.S. border and ports of entry do not require reasonable 
suspicion;201 second, asserting that, even if they do, forensic extraterritorial electronic border 
 
199 Id.; In re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d 157, 173-74 (2d Cir. 2008). 
200 See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S 149, 155-56 (2004) (damage to physical 
property); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 542 (1985) (finding that 
detention of person being searched must be reasonably related to the circumstances which 
justified it initially); United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661, 667 (9th Cir. 1976) (“[T]he 
individual is on notice that his privacy may be invaded when he crosses the border”); Montoya 
de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 543 (permitting CBP officers to detain an individual “for such time as 
necessary to confirm their suspicions”). 
201 See infra part II.A. 
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searches at Preclearance locations do not.202 The first part will rely on the historical distinction 
between searches of one’s person and one’s property; on the assertion that Riley and Carpenter 
do not control the Court’s analysis in the border search context; and on the fact that forensic 
electronic searches are often less invasive than manual searches.203 The second part will contend 
(1) the Fourth Amendment applies at Preclearance locations; (2) travelers’ privacy expectations 
are further reduced in a foreign country; and (3) the Government’s legitimate interests, already at 
their “zenith” at traditional border control locations, are even greater at Preclearance locations.204 
A. Forensic electronic border searches do not require reasonable suspicion. 
This part of my analysis will argue that forensic electronic border searches that are 
conducted on U.S. territory do not require reasonable suspicion. First, this Comment will 
distinguish between border searches of property and border searches of persons and examine 
how the Ninth Circuit and the district court in Alasaad v. Nielsen failed to apply this distinction. 
Second, it will demonstrate that Riley does not apply in the border search context. Third, this 
Comment will note that forensic electronic searches can be less invasive of one’s privacy than 
manual searches. 
 
202 See infra part II.B  
203 See infra part II.A. 
204 See infra part II.B. 
48 
 
1. Searches of property and persons implicate fundamentally different 
privacy interests. 
That nonroutine border searches require reasonable suspicion, and that routine ones do 
not, is undisputed.205 Further, most courts that require reasonable suspicion for forensic 
electronic border searches do not contend that manual electronic border searches mandate such 
suspicion.206 Thus, the issues are whether forensic electronic border searches are somehow 
nonroutine and whether they implicate significantly different privacy interests than manual 
searches. Border search jurisprudence, as well as other Fourth Amendment case law, answers in 
the negative and suggests that a far greater disparity in privacy concerns exists between searches 
of property and persons.  
The Court has only found searches of the alimentary canal and strip, body cavity, and 
involuntary x-ray searches—all of which are searches of the person—to be nonroutine.207 
Dissenting from the majority opinion in Montoya de Hernandez, Justice Brennan went so far as 
to suggest that a warrant should be required for intrusive searches of the person, which constitute 
“an extreme invasion of personal privacy.”208 In contrast, in Flores-Montano, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist explicitly distinguished between “highly intrusive searches of the person” and 
searches of property, finding that vehicles can be searched at the border without reasonable 
 
205 E.g., United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1012 (9th Cir. 2019). 
206 E.g., id. at 1016. 
207 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985); id. at 541 n. 4. 
208 Id. at 556 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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suspicion, and no justice disagreed.209 Further, while the Court has long, and often, held that “an 
invasion of bodily integrity implicates an individual’s most personal and deep-rooted 
expectations of privacy,” congressionally-authorized suspicionless border searches of property 
predate the Fourth Amendment.210  
Applying the above principles to the facts of Alasaad v. Nielsen reveals how the Court 
would decide such a case.  In that case, plaintiffs sued CBP, alleging that several of its officers 
violated the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures when 
the officers searched their electronic devices at ports of entry to the United States.211 Many of the 
plaintiffs’ stories present minor or no issues under the Fourth Amendment and the border search 
exception. The main complaint most plaintiffs had was that CBP officers searched their devices 
without individualized suspicion,212 which officers may do for any other piece of property.213 
Another concern was the length of time for which their persons and their devices were 
detained.214 However, nothing in the facts suggests that either were detained for longer than 
 
209 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004). 
210 Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013) (quotations marks omitted); Act of July 31, 
1789, 1 St. 29, 43. 
211 Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC, 2019 WL 5899371, at *1, *1 (D. Mass. Nov. 12, 
2019). 
212 See e.g., Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at *1, *5 (May 9, 
2018) (denying motion to dismiss). 
213 Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 151-52. 
214 Alasaad, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC, 2019 WL 5899371, at *3. 
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“necessary to confirm [the CBP officers’] suspicions” in violation of Montoya de Hernandez’s 
holding.215 There, officers conducted a highly intrusive alimentary canal search and detained the 
defendant for “almost 24 hours,”216 which the Court concluded was not unreasonably long.217  
Here, officers generally examined the plaintiffs’ property for about twenty minutes and, at most, 
three and a half hours.218 Even the fact that one plaintiff, a non-U.S. citizen,219 was personally 
detained for seven hours while officers searched his phone pales in comparison to the detention 
of the defendant in Montoya de Hernandez.220 Only the plaintiff whose phone’s functionality was 
damaged has a colorable claim, given that the search was somewhat destructive of his 
property.221  
 
215 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 543 (1985); 
216 Id.. at 546 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
217 Id. at 544. 
218 See Alasaad, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at *5-*8. 
219 Cf. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) (“The alien, to whom the United States 
has been traditionally hospitable, has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as 
he increases his identity with our society. Mere lawful presence in the country creates an implied 
assurance of safe conduct and gives him certain rights; they become more extensive and secure 
when he makes preliminary declaration of intention to become a citizen, and they expand to 
those of full citizenship upon naturalization.”) 
220 Alasaad, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at *6. 
221 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155-56 (2004). 
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Although the Ninth Circuit argued that the Government could not reasonably expect 
travelers to leave devices or files they did not want searched at home or on a home computer 
because of the inconvenience that would impose, the Eleventh Circuit rightly countered that “the 
Fourth Amendment does not guarantee the right to travel without great inconvenience.”222 To 
support this assertion, Judge Pryor provided the example of the extensive TSA screening 
procedures which are now required for all airplane passengers.223 Thus, although all the Alasaad 
plaintiffs were undoubtedly subjected to “great inconvenience” while traveling, the 
inconvenience associated with air travel—not to mention the centuries-old requirement that 
international travelers must go through customs—is reasonably expected, and the Government 
cannot be expected to abdicate its role in preventing the introduction of contraband into the 
United States to spare less than one percent of international travelers to the United States from 
inconvenience. In Flores-Montano, the Court likewise acknowledged that “[r]espondent points to 
no cases indicating the Fourth Amendment shields entrants from inconvenience or delay at the 
international border.”224 
 
222 United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2018). 
223 Id. 
224 Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155 n.3; see also United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 152 (4th 
Cir. 2018) (Wilkinson, J. concurring) (“The general search that all of us must undergo at airports 
attests to the difficulties of ensuring airborne security through individualized suspicion. Our new 
world has brought inconvenience and intrusions on an indiscriminate basis, which none of us 
welcome, but which most of us undergo in the interest of assuring a larger common good. Our 
old world of relative security and relative privacy, if indeed it ever existed, is now gone with the 
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Additionally, the Ninth Circuit misapplied the Court’s note in Ramsey that it was not 
deciding whether a border search might be deemed “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment 
“because of the particularly offensive manner in which it is carried out.”225 Judge McKeown 
understood this note to mean that “particularly offensive” searches require reasonable 
suspicion.226 However, this reading is inaccurate for at least two reasons. First, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist explained in Ramsey that “unreasonable” meant “embraced within the prohibition of 
the Fourth Amendment,” or in other words, inconsistent with or in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.227 Second, in the footnote, “particularly offensive” modifies the “manner” of the 
search, not the search itself.228 In this sense, while the act of searching an electronic device may 
be particularly offensive to some due to, for instance, the contents of the device, theoretically, 
the searcher must do so in an offensive manner to violate the Fourth Amendment.229 After all, in 
 
wind. It is painful to dream of retrieving what is ours no longer.”); id. at 153 (“At what point the 
domestic conveniences of cell phone use should ripen into transnational entitlements is primarily 
for the political branches to determine.”). 
225 United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618 n.13 (1977). 
226 United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 2013). 
227 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 622.  
228 Id. at 618 n. 13. 
229 I say “theoretically” because the Court has never held a search to have been conducted in a 
“particularly offensive manner.” United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154 n.2 (2004) 
(“We again leave open the question ‘whether, and under what circumstances, a border search 
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Montoya de Hernandez, the Court found the alimentary canal search was carried out in a 
reasonable manner, although the “humiliating” or highly intrusive nature of such a search 
requires reasonable suspicion.230 If a twenty-four-hour detention that included officials’ refusal 
to allow the defendant to use the bathroom in private and a compulsory rectal examination can be 
conducted in a reasonable manner, surely an impersonal, automatic, software-driven search of an 
electronic device can be.231 That such searches can uncover highly personal private information 
does not alter the Fourth Amendment calculus, since CBP officers have been searching physical 
containers holding intimate articles without individualized suspicion for centuries.232 More 
importantly, since the Court has only determined the level of suspicion required for “highly 
intrusive [border] searches of the person,” no Supreme Court precedent supports the argument 
that border searches of property may be, by their nature, highly intrusive of one’s privacy and 
 
might be deemed unreasonable because of the particularly offensive manner in which it is carried 
out (internal quotation marks omitted).’”). 
230 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 544 (1985). 
231 Cf. United States v. Feiten, No. 15-206, 2016 WL 894452 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 9, 2016) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (“The OS Triage[, a software used for forensic laptop searches,] is 
actually less invasive of personal privacy than is a search done by hand. A border agent 
inspecting a computer manually, page-by-page in an electronic format, would access any 
document or program stored on the device, but a forensic preview using OS Triage merely 
allows a thumbnail preview of pictures and videos on a computer and can identify which of those 
pictures and videos have file names that match known file names of child pornography.”) 
232 See supra note 27. 
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require particularized suspicion.233 As this Comment argues below, to the extent that lower 
courts have found that Riley is one such case, they are incorrect. 
2. Riley does not control the Court’s analysis in the border search context. 
Riley, and the Riley-esque principles reaffirmed in Carpenter, do not apply electronic 
border searches. In Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit nonetheless asserted that electronic devices are 
different from every other type of property.234 Judge McKeown wrote, “[t]he private information 
individuals store on digital devices—their personal ‘papers’ in the words of the Constitution—
stands in stark contrast to the generic and impersonal contents of a gas tank.”235 Of course, given 
the scarcity of border search jurisprudence and recency of the Flores-Montano decision, Judge 
McKeown’s choice of a gas tank as a piece of property other than an electronic device to which 
she could compare electronic devices is not surprising. Nonetheless, if Judge McKeown wished 
to make a true distinction between electronic devices and other types of property, she would have 
chosen a closer analogue: a physical object with non-generic and personal contents. For example, 
if one instead compares electronic devices to brief cases filled with medical and financial 
records, her distinction falls away.  
Regardless, the purpose of this Comment, much less this section, is not to argue that 
Riley was wrongly decided or that Riley-esque principles do not have their place in certain 
contexts. Rather, this section seeks to demonstrate that Riley does not control in the border 
search context. After all, the Court did not intend for its Riley holding to be applied outside of 
 
233 Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152. 
234 United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 964 (9th Cir. 2013). 
235 Id.  
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the search-incident-to-arrest context, with Chief Justice Roberts warning against “untether[ing] 
the rule from the justifications underlying the” exception.236  
Ensuring officer safety and preventing the destruction of evidence justify the search-
incident-to-arrest exception, which are entirely distinct justifications from any that could be 
reasonably associated with the border search exception, such as preventing the introduction of 
contraband into the United States.237 Therefore, applying Riley to the border search context 
would be inconsistent with Riley itself.238 Further, in Riley, Chief Justice Roberts narrowly 
resolved the issue of whether the search-incident-to-arrest exception applies to cellphones by 
reasoning that neither justification for the search-incident-to-arrest exception applies, arguably 
making his discussion of the privacy interests implicated by cellphone searches dicta.239 
Consequently, it would be even more far-fetched to apply Riley’s principles out of context.  
 
236 Id. at 205 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014)); see also Helen Hong, 
Border Searches of Digital Devices, 67 DOJ J. Fed. L. & Prac. 199, 207 (2019) (“[U]nlike the 
Supreme Court in Riley, the majority [in Cotterman] did not focus on whether border searches of 
digital devices bear some nexus to the justification for supporting the searches as a category.”). 
237 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
238 See United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[In Riley,] the Supreme 
Court expressly limited its holding to the search-incident-to-arrest exception.”). 
239 See Riley, 573 U.S. at 386.  
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Nonetheless, in Alasaad, Judge Casper reasoned that Riley could be applied to the border 
search context largely because both exceptions tilt in favor of the Government.240 Any time 
courts permit the government to conduct searches and seizures without a warrant they are, by 
definition, recognizing that government interests outweigh individual privacy interests and 
weighing their analysis in favor of the Government.241 That Chief Justice Roberts himself in 
Riley left open the question of whether “other case-specific Riley exceptions may still justify a 
warrantless search of a particular phone” suggests that it is equally, if not more, likely that the 
border search exception continues to apply to cellphones and other electronic devices as it does 
to other forms of property in the absence of an explicit Court holding to the contrary.242 
Bolstering this wager is the fact that both phone searches at issue in Riley were manual.243 Thus, 
relying on Riley to require reasonable suspicion for forensic electronic border searches, but not 
for manual ones—which, in the electronic border search context, is the one principle on which 
most lower courts agree244—involves a strange contortion of precedent that ignores the distinct 
facts and reasoning of Riley.  
 
240 Alasaad v. Nielsen, No.17-cv-11730-DJC, 2019 WL 5899371, at *1, *12 (D. Mass. Nov. 12, 
2019). 
241 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537-538 (1985).  
242 Riley, 573 U.S. at 402; see also United States v. Saboonchi, 48 F. Supp. 3d 815, 817 (D. Md. 
2014) (finding that the “[t]he border search is one such case-specific exception” and, thus, that 
the border search exception is “unaffected” by Riley). 
243 Riley, 573 U.S. at 379; id. at 380. 
244 See supra part I.A.1. 
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3. Forensic electronic border searches are often less invasive than manual 
ones. 
Requiring reasonable suspicion for forensic electronic border searches, but not for 
manual searches, is a perplexing holding because the former are often less invasive than the 
latter. A border officer inspecting an electronic device manually could access any document or 
program stored on the device.245 However, one kind of forensic software used to inspect laptops 
only allows a thumbnail preview of pictures and videos on the laptop and identifies which of 
those pictures and videos have file names that match those known files of child sexual abuse 
imagery.246 This software “cannot locate deleted files or files that may be stored in carved or 
unallocated space nor can it access files that have been password-protected.”247 The use of this 
software—which one judge called an “exercise of electronic restraint on the part of border 
agents”248—is not dissimilar to a canine sniff for narcotics in a piece of luggage, where the only 
information the sniff discloses is the presence or absence of contraband.249 Thus, that a canine 
sniff is not even a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment supports the notion that 
forensic searches, which often only disclose the presence or absence of digital contraband such 
as child sexual abuse imagery, do not require reasonable suspicion.250 Further, if one views 
 
245 United States v. Feiten, No. 15-20631, 2016 WL 894452, at *1, *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 9, 2016). 
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electronic devices as digital equivalents to homes at the border, any software that locates deleted 
files is merely searching the digital analog of garbage abandoned and left outside the curtilage of 
the home. The latter is not entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy, so neither is the 
former.251  
B. Forensic extraterritorial border searches may be conducted without reasonable 
suspicion. 
In general, “when the United States acts against citizens abroad it can[not] do so free of 
the Bill of Rights.”252 However, whether a particular provision of the Constitution applies 
extraterritorially must be determined “as questions arise.”253 Specifically, one must consider 
whether judicial enforcement of the constitutional provision in question would be “impracticable 
and anomalous.”254 At Preclearance locations, CBP officers perform the same border search 
function that they do at traditional border and port of entry locations, exercising authorities for 
the search of the person and property of U.S. persons.255 Judicial enforcement of the Warrant 
Clause abroad with respect to electronic border searches would be “impracticable” and 
 
251 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988). 
252 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957). 
253 Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (1904). 
254 Reid, 354 U.S. at 74-75 (Harlan, J., concurring); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 
U.S. 259, 277-78 (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
255 See 19 U.S.C. § 1629 (inspections and pre-clearance in foreign countries); 8 U.S.C. § 1125a 
(pre-inspection at foreign airports); 8 U.S.C. § 235.5 (pre-inspection has the same effect as the 
final determination of admissibility). 
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“anomalous” for the reasons cited in In re Terrorist Bombings.256 Specifically, (1) a warrant has 
never been required for any border search;257 (2) the Preclearance agreements concluded thus far 
have not included a warrant requirement;258 (3) U.S. warrants would be a “dead letter” abroad;259 
and (4) it is unclear whether U.S. judicial officers possess the authority to issue warrants for 
extraterritorial searches.260 However, several courts have at least proven their ability to assess the 
reasonableness of extraterritorial searches.261  
In cases in which the Court has found that a particular constitutional provision does not 
apply extraterritorially, such as Eisentrager and Verdugo, the main pitfall was the defendants’ 
relationship to the United States—or the lack thereof—a non-issue with respect to U.S. 
 
256 552 F.3d 157, 169-171 (2d Cir. 2008). 
257 See supra Introduction. 
258 See e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas on Preclearance, U.S.-The Bahamas, art. 
III(d), Apr. 23, 1974, 25 U.S.T. 646 (“The Government of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas 
shall . . . furnish appropriate law enforcement assistance to the United States inspectors, 
including, upon request by a United States inspector, search by a Bahamian law enforcement 
officer in the presence of a United States officer of any person subject to preclearance . . . based 
on suspicion that such person is seeking to carry into the United States . . . merchandise or other 
articles the entry of which into the United States is prohibited or restricted . . . .”).  
259 In re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 171 (citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274). 
260 In Re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 171. 
261 See supra part I.B.1. 
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persons.262 Thus, at least with respect to U.S. persons, the Fourth Amendment applies to forensic 
extraterritorial electronic border searches at Preclearance locations.263 Further, because CBP 
officers perform the same function that they do at traditional border locations, Preclearance 
locations act as functional equivalents of the border, and the border search exception applies.264 
Additionally, the Government’s legitimate interests, already at their “zenith” at traditional 
border locations, are even greater at Preclearance stations, and since Fourth Amendment claims 
are generally weaker where the United States does not enjoy de jure sovereignty, travelers’ 
privacy expectations are further reduced abroad.265 With respect to the former, the establishment 
of Preclearance locations builds on the traditional justification for the border search exception, 
preventing the introduction of contraband into the United States. After 9/11 and, in particular, the 
attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit on 
December 25, 2009, the Preclearance program was greatly expanded to “address threats at the 
earliest possible point” and stop terrorists who sought to “avoid U.S. screening and targeting 
efforts by carrying out attacks on U.S.-bound aircraft before arrival in the United States.”266 Thus, 
 
262 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 782 (1950); Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271. 
263 Cf. Brittany Davidson, Note, Shoot First, Ask Questions Later: Constitution Rights at the 
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Boumediene, the Fourth Amendment applies in Mexican territory near the U.S.-Mexico border). 
264 See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973). 
265 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 268. 
266 CBP, Preclearance Expansion: FY2016 Guidance for Prospective Applicants, available at 
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even if territorial forensic electronic border searches require reasonable suspicion, extraterritorial 
ones do not because the balance of interests favors the Government. However, were an 
extraterritorial electronic border search ever to be challenged as unlawful, the court would have 
to consider the In re Terrorist Bombings and Stokes factors listed above: whether there was any 
damage to physical property; whether the scope of the search was appropriately limited; whether 
the search was conducted covertly or without notice to the defendant; and whether the search 
was longer than necessary to confirm the officers’ suspicions.267 
Conclusion 
Before the Fourth Amendment was even ratified, U.S. customs officers exercised plenary 
authority to prevent the entry of contraband into the United States and to search ships and other 
containers in furtherance of that powerful governmental interest. Despite this longstanding 
authority, lower courts have been sharply divided on whether to restrict CBP’s ability to inspect 
electronic media at the border or functional equivalents of the border because of the privacy 
concerns that they implicate or whether to empower CBP to flexibly respond to a novel medium 
for smuggling easily hidden digital contraband into the United States. An additional 
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complicating factor that this Comment has considered is extraterritoriality. In other words, it has 
examined what level of suspicion is required for electronic border searches at CBP Preclearance 
locations.  
First, this Comment demonstrated that searches of one’s person implicate far greater 
privacy concerns than searches of property; Riley does not control in the border search context; 
and forensic electronic border searches are often less invasive than manual ones, all for the 
proposition that forensic electronic border searches at the U.S. border and ports of entry do not 
require reasonable suspicion. Then, it noted that, based on the Supreme Court precedent 
available and harmonious lower court jurisprudence, the Fourth Amendment applies to U.S. 
persons abroad and maintained that CBP officers at Preclearance locations are only subject to a 
flexible reasonableness requirement under the Fourth Amendment. This reasonableness 
requirement weighs in favor of not imposing an unduly burdensome reasonable suspicion 
constraint on CBP officers at Preclearance locations, given the further reduced privacy 
expectations of travelers at these locations and the further heightened government interest in 
preventing the entry of contraband and dangerous persons into the United States.  
Some have gone so far as to argue that the required level of suspicion for electronic 
border searches is “principally a legislative question, not a judicial one” and that the political 
branches “are much better equipped . . . to appreciate both the privacy interests at stake and the 
magnitude of the practical risks involved.”268 However, until Congress enacts legislation on this 
 
268 E.g., United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 148-49 (4th Cir. 2018) (Wilkinson, J., 
concurring) (“Might we wish to hear in a manner more probing than appellate briefs and oral 
argument exactly what are the dimensions of the threats we face? What makes us think the 
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issue, courts should apply border search doctrine pursuant to longstanding jurisprudence and 
historical practice that accords significant deference to the Executive Branch in this context. CBP 
Preclearance, and customs inspections in general, may be highly “vexatious” at times, but it is 
quickly becoming the United States’ first line of defense in an increasingly interconnected and 
increasingly complex world that requires elastic and innovative legal doctrines to permit the 
detection of the very few items and enemies who mean us harm. 
 
 
 
 
 
elective branches would downgrade the significant privacy interests the majority rightly 
identifies? Might the other two branches, if given a fair chance, have something to say? And do 
not Articles I and II, which set forth the legislative and executive roles in matters of grave 
international import, give them the right to say it? Who are we to propound the idea that 
democratic bodies, where Fourth Amendment reasonableness is concerned, have nothing to 
contribute?”). 
